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Abstract—Consider an existing Elastic Optical Network (EON)
with a given topology composed by nodes and connecting fibers,
each fiber with a given spectrum capacity. Consider an estimated
set of demands to be supported and a routing, modulation and
spectrum assignment (RMSA) policy adopted by the operator
both for the regular state and for the failure states. First, we
address the resilience evaluation of the EON to multiple node
failures. We adopt a worst-case approach by identifying the nodes
(named critical nodes) whose simultaneous failure maximally
reduce the demand percentage that is supported by the network
and we use this percentage as the resilience metric. Then, for
the same estimated demands, the same RMSA policy and a fiber
budget equal to the total fiber length of the existing network,
we address the design problem aiming to determine a new EON
maximizing the resilience metric imposed by its critical nodes.
We use a multi-start greedy randomized method that generates
multiple EONs and returns the best one, i.e., the EON with
the highest resilience metric. We run the evaluation and design
methods on known network topologies. The computational results
let us (i) analyze the efficiency of the methods and (ii) assess how
far the resilience of existing networks are from the best ones.
Index Terms—EON; Transparent Optical Networks; Critical
Node Detection; Resilient Network Design; Disasters
I. INTRODUCTION
Large-scale failures are becoming more frequent in time
and wider in scope severely disrupting telecommunication net-
works and services [1]. So, both the impact evaluation of large-
scale failures on existing networks and the design of networks
more resilient to large-scale failures are becoming key issues
(two surveys addressing these issues are [2] on strategies to
protect networks against large-scale natural disasters and [3]
on security challenges in communication networks).
Large-scale failures might involve only network links or
network nodes and links (a node failure implies that its
links fail). For example, in malicious human attacks, node
shutdowns are harder to realize than link cuts but are the
most rewarding in the attacker’s perspective (a node shutdown
also shuts down multiple links). Moreover, power outages shut
down nodes since fiber links do not require power supply.
Here, we consider as large-scale failures the case of multiple
node failures as they are the most harmful.
In EONs, the optical spectrum of each fiber link is organized
in frequency slots (FSs). Each demand between a pair of
nodes is routed over an end-to-end lightpath (we assume a
transparent optical network). On each direction of a lightpath,
data is converted in the source from electrical to optical
domain using a modulation format (MF) emitting on a set
of contiguous FSs, transmitted through a routing path over
the optical network and converted back to electrical domain
in the target node. At the network level, multiple lightpaths
can be set up if their FSs do not overlap on any fiber link.
Due to many factors, there is a maximum length, named
transparent reach, for the routing path of a lightpath. Also,
the MF of a lightpath impacts both its transparent reach and
its number of FSs. For example, in a single carrier lightpath,
a 16-QAM MF carries twice the number of bits/symbol of
the QPSK MF but imposes a shorter transparent reach. So,
in a shorter routing path, the same line rate (in bits/second)
can be transmitted by 16-QAM instead of QPSK with a half
symbol rate which occupies less FSs [4]. Moreover, OFDM
enables each lightpath to be composed by a bunch of sub-
carriers, which can be partially overlapping in the spectrum
domain reaching spectrum gains [5], [6]. In this case, multiple
sub-carriers with uniform symbol rate and bits/symbol can be
selected for a required line rate so that the transparent reach
of the lightpath is enough to the length of its routing path [4].
So, for a required demand line rate, a more spectrum effi-
cient MF configuration is one that requires a smaller number of
FSs but imposes a shorter transparent reach (the main principle
behind the distance-adaptive spectrum allocation strategies
[4], [7]). When the MF of each required lightpath is fixed,
the decision on the routing path and FSs of each lightpath
is known as the routing and spectrum assignment (RSA)
problem. When multiple MFs are available, the assignment
problem includes the selection of the MF configuration to
each lightpath, which is known as the routing, modulation
and spectrum assignment (RMSA) problem and has been
addressed in many works and different contexts [4]– [15].
The failure of multiple nodes on an EON has three different
impact factors. First, all demands with one end node which is
a failure node are lost. Second, if the failure nodes disconnect
the network into different components, all demands with end
nodes in different components are also lost. Third, a demand
whose routing path of its lightpath contains at least one failure
node, if the demand is in the same network component,
it might be reassigned with a different lightpath. Then, its
reassignment might require a different MF in a longer routing
path which, in turn, might require more FSs in more links.
So, the network might not have enough spectrum resources to
reassign lightpaths to all such demands.
Consider an existing EON with a given topology composed
by nodes and connecting fibers, each fiber with a given
capacity in number of FSs. Consider an estimated demand
set and a RMSA policy adopted by the operator both for
the regular and for the failure states. First, we address the
resilience evaluation of the EON to multiple node failures. If
the critical nodes are given, the RMSA can maximize the total
demand still supported when all critical nodes fail, as in [16]
where the approach in [17] is adapted to such case. Here, the
critical nodes are not given. Instead, our resilience evaluation
adopts a worst-case approach by identifying the critical nodes
as the set of nodes whose simultaneous failure maximally
reduce the demand percentage that is still supported. So,
the critical nodes are the result of an optimization problem
and the obtained demand percentage is used as the resilience
metric. Then, for the same set of estimated demands, the same
RMSA policy and a fiber budget equal to the total fiber length
of an existing EON, we address the design problem aiming
to determine a new EON maximizing the resilience metric
imposed by its critical nodes.
Critical Node Detection (CND) problems have been consid-
ered in different contexts [18]– [21] and are gaining special
attention in the vulnerability evaluation of telecommunication
networks to large-scale failures [2]. Other metrics have been
used to evaluate the network vulnerability in other con-
texts [22] or assuming multiple geographical correlated fail-
ures [23]. There are also works on improving the preparedness
of networks to multiple failures, some by changing the network
topology [24]– [26], while others by proposing strategies to
recover from failures [27], [28]. CND is used in [29] as a
resilience metric in the optimal robust node selection problem.
Both the evaluation and network design of optical networks
resilient to multiple node failures were addressed in [30]. In
that work, though, the RMSA is not considered as spectrum
capacity of links is assumed to be infinite, i.e., the third impact
factor is ignored in the resilience evaluation.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the
RMSA policy considered both for the regular and for the
failure states. Section III presents the resilience evaluation
method while Section IV presents the EON design method.
The computational results are discussed in Section V. Finally,
Section VI draws the main conclusions of the work.
II. ROUTING, MODULATION AND SPECTRUM ASSIGNMENT
For a given EON and a given set of demands, the RMSA
policy rules the way lightpaths are assigned both in the regular
state and in any failure state. Here, we adapt the proposal
in [10] to both cases. Consider the EON topology represented
by an undirected graph G = (N,E) with a set of nodes N =
{1, ..., |N |} and a set of links E ⊆ {(i, j) ∈ N×N : i < j}
whose lengths are represented as lij . Set F = {1, 2, ..., |F |}
is the ordered set of FSs available on each fiber link.
Set D is the estimated set of demands. Each d ∈ D is
defined by its source node sd and target node td, sd < td
(multiple demands between the same end nodes can exist and
we let their supporting lightpaths to have different routing
paths). Here, we assume a single line rate optical network
(i.e., all demands require the same line rate in bits/second)
but its generalization to multiple line rates is straightforward.
To model the RMSA solution, we need two additional sets.
Set M is the set of MF configurations for the considered line
rate. Each m ∈ M is defined by its number of contiguous
FSs nm (this value includes the required guard band between
lightpaths) and its transparent reach Tm. Set Pd is the set
of lightpath candidate paths to demand d ∈ D. The optical
length of path p ∈ Pd is the sum of its link lengths plus
a length value ∆ per intermediate node (which models the
optical degradation suffered by a lightpath while traversing an
intermediate optical switch). Each path p ∈ Pd is defined by:
• the binary parameters βpk which are equal to 1 if node k
(which can be an end node) is in p or equal to 0 otherwise;
• the binary parameters αpij which are equal to 1 if link
(i, j), i < j is in p or equal to 0 otherwise;
• the integer parameter np indicating the number of FSs
of the most efficient MF configuration whose transparent
reach is not smaller than the optical length of p.
In [10], each demand has a fixed required number of FSs.
In our case, the required number of FSs is np which depends
on the candidate path p ∈ Pd. We associate to each d ∈ D
the parameter nd which gives the minimum number of FSs
required by any of its candidate paths p ∈ Pd, i.e., nd =
minp∈Pd np. Consider set Pe as the set of all candidate paths
of all demands that include link e ∈ E. Similar to [10], a
collision metric ce is computed for each link e ∈ E given
by ce =
∑
d∈D
∑
p∈(Pd∩Pe) np. Then, each candidate path
p ∈ ∪d∈DPd has an associated path length lp =
∑
e∈P ce used
to break ties when selecting candidate paths. All lp values are
precomputed and used as parameters in the RMSA.
The RMSA policy for the regular state is given by Algo-
rithm 1, a greedy algorithm that starts with an empty network
(i.e., all FSs are free in all links) and assigns iteratively to a
demand d ∈ D, a lightpath p ∈ Pd and a set of np contiguous
FSs. Each assignment is the one that packs as much as possible
the lightpaths in the lowest spectrum. Algorithm 1 starts by
computing the maximum value n among the nd values of all
demands (Step 1) and initializes set D¯ with all demands such
that nd = n (Step 3). Then, for each candidate path p of each
demand in D¯ (Step 6), the algorithm computes the lowest set
of np contiguous FSs that can be assigned without overlap with
previous assignments. The algorithm selects the candidate path
whose highest selected FS index is the lowest among all and,
as a tiebreaker, the one with the shorter path length lp (Steps
8 and 9). The selected path and associated set of FSs is used
to assign the lightpath to the corresponding demand (Step 12)
and the demand is removed from set D¯ (Step 13). When D¯
becomes empty, n is decreased and the algorithm continues
until n reaches 0.
Algorithm 1 RMSA
1: Initialize n← maxd∈D nd
2: while n ≥ 1 do
3: D¯ ← {d ∈ D : nd = n}
4: while D¯ 6= ∅ do
5: f¯ ←∞, l¯←∞, d¯← {} and p¯← {}
6: for all p ∈ Pd, d ∈ D¯ do
7: f ← highest FS index of the lowest set of np
contiguous FSs that can be assigned on p to d
without overlap with previous assignments
8: if f < f¯ or (f = f¯ and lp < l¯) then
9: f¯ ← f , l¯← lp, p¯← p and d¯← d
10: end if
11: end for
12: Assign to demand d¯ a lightpath on the candidate path
p¯ and on the FSs from f¯ − np¯ + 1 to f¯
13: D¯ ← D¯\d¯
14: end while
15: n← n− 1
16: end while
A key issue in the RMSA is the set of candidate paths Pd
to consider for each demand d ∈ D. In [10], a k-shortest path
algorithm is used with k = 3. Our tests have shown that a
value of k = 7 is required but not necessarily to all demands.
The best strategy is to consider for each demand d a number
of candidate paths equal to the minimum between 7 and the
number of nodes in the shortest path from sd to td plus one.
While the RMSA policy in the regular state is defined by
Algorithm 1, in a failure state a slightly different variant is
used. Lightpaths not disrupted by any failure node are not
changed. So, the algorithm considers the surviving network
(i.e., without the failure nodes and incident links) with the
FSs occupied by the non disrupted lightpaths. For the disrupted
demands whose end nodes are in the same component, a new
set of candidate paths and associated path lengths is computed.
Then, the RMSA is similar to Algorithm 1 but considers the
demands d in increasing order of their nd values (as opposed
to the decreasing order of Algorithm 1). Since the aim is to
reassign as much as possible the disrupted lightpaths, our tests
have shown that the increasing order is better, on average,
since the lightpaths requiring less number of FSs can better
fit in the initial fragmented spectrum.
III. RESILIENCE EVALUATION PROBLEM
The EON resilience to multiple node failures measures
their impact in the network capacity to support the estimated
demands. For a given number c ∈ N of failure nodes, we adopt
a worst-case approach by identifying a set of c critical nodes
whose simultaneous failure maximally reduce the demand
percentage that is supported.
For a given EON and a given set of lightpaths (assigned by
the RMSA policy to a given set of demands), the determination
of the critical nodes is a min-max bi-level optimization prob-
lem: at the bottom level, the RMSA policy aims to maximize
the demand percentage that is supported by a given set of
node failures; at the top level, the set of node failures aims to
minimize the demand percentage that the RMSA policy is able
to support. We solve the problem heuristically by computing
2 sets of failure nodes, running the RMSA policy for each set
and selecting the most damaging set as the critical node set.
The first set of failure nodes is computed by solving
the weighted version of the Critical Node Detection (CND)
problem shown to be efficiently solved by mixed integer linear
programming [21]. To compute the second set of failure nodes,
we propose a Node Demand Centrality (NDC) metric and use
it in a greedy approach to iteratively select the failure nodes.
Next, we describe separately each of the two methods.
CND based method. For each node i ∈ N , consider a
binary variable vi indicating whether i is a critical node or
not. For each node pair (i, j), with i < j, consider: (i) a
weight wij given by the sum of all demands d ∈ D whose
end nodes are i and j, (ii) a set Nij which is the set of adjacent
nodes to i (on graph G) if the degree of node i is not higher
than the degree of node j, or the set of adjacent nodes to j
otherwise, and (iii) a binary variable uij which is 1 if nodes
i and j are connected or 0 otherwise. For a given number c
of critical nodes, the CND problem is defined as:
min
∑
i,j∈N :i<j
wijuij (1)
s.t.
n∑
i=1
vi ≤ c , (2)
uij + vi + vj ≥ 1 , (i, j) ∈ E, (3)
uij ≥ uik + ujk −1 + vk, (i, j) /∈ E, k ∈ Nij , (4)
vi ∈ {0, 1} , i ∈ N, (5)
uij ∈ {0, 1} , i, j ∈ N : i < j. (6)
The objective (1) is to minimize the total weighted connec-
tivity, i.e., the sum of the weights of the node pairs that remain
connected when the critical nodes are removed. Constraint (2)
ensures that at most c nodes are selected as critical nodes
(in optimal solutions, c nodes are selected). Constraints (3)
guarantee that a pair of adjacent nodes is connected if none of
the two nodes is a critical node. Constraints (4) are an efficient
generalization of constraints (3) for the node pairs that are not
adjacent in G: node pair (i, j) is connected if there is a non-
critical node k ∈ Nij such that k is connected to both i and j.
Constraints (5-6) are the variable domain constraints. As noted
in [21], constraints (6) can be replaced by uij ≥ 0, reducing
the number of binary variables.
The set of failure nodes is computed by determining an
optimal solution of this model using an available ILP solver.
Note that such solution is an heuristic solution for our problem
since it does not take into account neither the transparent reach
of lightpaths nor the spectrum capacity of fiber links.
NDC (Node Demand Centrality) based method. The
proposed demand centrality of each node k ∈ N aims to
measure the impact of the node failure on the demands
between all other node pairs. Let us denote as pd the lightpath
p ∈ Pd assigned to a demand d ∈ D. The resources used by
each lightpath pd, denoted as Sd, are given by its number
of FSs times the number of hops of its routing path, i.e.,
Sd = nd ×
∑
(i,j)∈E α
p
ij . Then, the node failure impact is
measured as a combination of two quantities: (i) Q1 with
the total demand that can no longer be supported and (ii) Q2
with the minimum resources increase required to reassign new
lightpaths to demands that can be connected.
So, for each node k ∈ N and for each lightpath assigned to
a demand d between a pair of other nodes whose routing path
includes k, we compute the candidate path p′d ∈ Pd that does
not include k and requires the least amount of resources S′d.
If such candidate path does not exist, demand d is added to
Q1. If it exists and S′d > Sd, the value
S′d−Sd
Sd
is added to Q2,
or otherwise the demand is ignored. At the end, the demand
centrality rk of node k is rk = (Z ×Q1) +Q2. The factor Z
defines the relative weight between the two quantities. Based
on preliminary tests, the best results are obtained when Z is
either the highest value of S
′
d−Sd
Sd
, if any of such values was
added to Q2, or is 1 otherwise.
The set of failure nodes C is determined with a greedy
algorithm, presented in Algorithm 2, which uses the demand
centrality value of each node to select the failure nodes. The
algorithm starts with graph G (representing the EON network)
and set D (of all demands with lightpaths assigned by the
RMSA policy) in Line 1. On each cycle, the algorithm (i)
computes the demand centrality rk of each node k (Lines
4–23), (ii) computes the node k¯ with the highest demand
centrality (Line 24), (iii) selects node k¯ as a failure node
(Line 25), (iv) the demands routed through node k¯ are removed
from D (Line 26) and (v) node k¯ and its incident links are
removed from G (Line 27). The algorithm ends when the
desired number c of nodes has been determined (Line 28).
IV. NETWORK DESIGN PROBLEM
For the same set of demands, the same RMSA policy and
a fiber budget B equal to the total fiber length of an existing
EON, the design problem determines a new EON maximizing
the resilience metric imposed by its critical nodes.
We have seen in the previous section that the evaluation (i.e.,
the determination of the resilience metric imposed by the EON
critical nodes) is a min-max bi-level optimization problem. In
the network design case, since we aim to compute an EON
maximizing its evaluation value, this problem is a max-min-
max tri-level optimization problem. To solve this problem, we
use a multi-start greedy randomized heuristic similar to the one
proposed in [30] that generates multiple EONs and returns the
one whose resilience metric is the highest.
First, the greedy randomized algorithm (Algorithm 3) is
used to compute each new EON. Algorithm 3 starts with an
initial graph G = (N,E0) composed by the set of nodes
N of the original EON and by the set of links E0 given
by the Relative Neighbourhood Graph (RNG) [31]. RNG is
defined as follows: nodes i, j ∈ N are connected by a link
Algorithm 2 NDC based method
1: Given G = (N,E) and demand set D.
2: C ← ∅
3: repeat
4: Z ← 0, rk ← 0 and ck ← 0, for all k ∈ N\C
5: for all k ∈ N do
6: for all d ∈ D : sd 6= k and td 6= k do
7: if k ∈ pd then
8: Compute p′d ∈ Pd that does not include k and
requires the least amount of resources S′d
9: if p′d does not exist then
10: ck ← ck + 1
11: else
12: if S′d > Sd then
13: rk ← rk + S
′
d−Sd
Sd
14: Z ← max (Z, S′d−SdSd )
15: end if
16: end if
17: end if
18: end for
19: if Z = 0 then
20: Z = 1
21: end if
22: rk ← Z × rk + ck
23: end for
24: k¯ ← index k such that rk is maximal
25: C ← C ∪ {k¯}
26: D ← D\{d ∈ D : k¯ ∈ pd}
27: N ← N\{k¯}, E ← E\{(i, j) ∈ E : i = k¯ or j = k¯}
28: until |C| = c
if and only if there is no other node k ∈ N\{i, j} such
that lik ≤ lij and ljk ≤ lij . Then, the algorithm randomly
selects one link (is, js) at a time until no new link can
be added within the remaining budget BR. The probability
of each link being selected at each iteration is as follows.
Assume Es is the set of already selected links, δi is the
degree of node i in G = (N,Es) and the remaining budget is
BR = B −
∑
(i,j)∈Es lij . For all node pairs (i, j) /∈ Es such
that lij ≤ BR and at least one of the nodes has the lowest
degree in G, the probability of selecting link (i, j) is:
P
(
(i, j)
)
=
1
(|δi − δj |+ 1) lij2
(7)
while for all other node pairs (i, j), P
(
(i, j)
)
= 0.
Multiple runs of Algorithm 3 generate different EONs. So,
in a multi-start greedy randomized algorithm, we run multiple
times Algorithm 3, evaluate the resilience metric of each EON
and return the best generated one. The multi-start greedy
randomized algorithm is presented in Algorithm 4 with a
stopping criteria given by a pre-defined number of iterations.
The best EON is defined as G¯ with a resilience metric z¯.
Algorithm 4 starts by initializing G¯ = (N, ∅) and z¯ = 0.
At each iteration, Algorithm 4 (i) generates a new EON G′
(Line 3), (ii) checks if G′ is valid (Line 4), (iii) computes its
resilience value z1 by the CDN based method, (iv) if z1 is
better than z¯, computes its resilience value z2 by the NDC
based method (Algorithm 2) and the resilience value z of G′
(Lines 6–8) and (v) if z is better than the resilience value z¯ of
the current best EON, G¯ and z¯ are updated accordingly (Lines
9–10).
Algorithm 3 Greedy Randomized Algorithm
1: Compute initial graph G = (N,E0)
2: Set BR ← B −
∑
(i,j)∈E0 lij
3: repeat
4: Select a link (is, js) with link probabilities given by (7)
5: E ← E ∪ {(is, js)}
6: BR ← BR − lisjs
7: until P
(
(i, j)
)
= 0, for all i, j ∈ N : i < j
Algorithm 4 Multi-Start Greedy Randomized Algorithm
1: G¯← (N, ∅), z¯ ← 0
2: repeat
3: Generate a new graph G′ = (N,E′) using Algorithm 3.
4: if G′ is a valid EON then
5: Compute z1 using the CND based method
6: if z1 > z¯ then
7: Compute z2 using Algorithm 2
8: z ← min{z1, z2}
9: if z > z¯ then
10: G¯← G′, z¯ ← z
11: end if
12: end if
13: end if
14: until Pre-defined number of iterations reached
Two issues require further explanation. First, a randomly
generated EON G′ is valid (Line 4) if it can support all
demands with the RMSA policy. To validate G′, we run
Algorithm 1 and check if the highest FS index is within the
total number of FSs available on each fiber link. Moreover,
when the topology of the original EON is 2-connected, we
also require G′ to be 2-connected (i.e, any single node failure
still allows the establishment of a lightpath between any pair
of nodes within the transparent reach T = maxm∈M Tm).
Second, for each valid EON, Algorithm 4 computes first
its resilience value z1 by the CDN based method (Line 5). If
z1 ≤ z¯, the EON cannot be better than the best one found
so far and, so, the EON can be discarded without running
Algorithm 2. The results show that z1 is computed much faster
than z2 and, so, Algorithm 4 is more time efficient in this way.
V. COMPUTATIONAL RESULTS
The computational results are based on 3 network topologies
with public available information: Germany50 [32], Palmet-
toNet [33] and Missouri Network Alliance (MissouriNA) [33].
Table I presents their topology characteristics in terms of num-
ber of nodes |N | and fiber links |E|, minimum (δmin), average
(δ¯) and maximum (δmax) node degree and an indication (in
column ’2-C’) if the topology is 2-connected. Although the
geographical location of nodes is known, the geographical
routes of fiber links is not. So, to compute link lengths, we
have assumed that links follow the shortest path over the Earth
surface. Table II presents the resulting length characteristics
in terms of minimum (lmin), average (l¯), maximum (lmax)
and total (L) link length, and diameter, i.e., the highest length
among all shortest paths adding ∆ per intermediate node (the
length ∆ modeling the degradation suffered by a lightpath on
each intermediate node was 60 Km).
Table I: Topology characteristics of each network.
Network |N | |E| δmin δ¯ δmax 2-C
Germany50 50 88 2 3.52 5 Yes
PalmettoNet 45 64 1 2.84 5 No
MissouriNA 64 80 1 2.50 5 No
Table II: Length characteristics (in km) of each network.
Network lmin l¯ lmax L Diameter
Germany50 26 100.7 252 8859 1417
PalmettoNet 19 67.0 177 4286 1298
MissouriNA 7 50.0 307 4001 1301
Concerning fiber capacity, we consider each fiber with a
capacity of |F | = 320 FSs which corresponds to a spectral
grid of granularity 12.5 GHz. Concerning MF configurations
(recall discussion on the Introduction), realistic transparent
reach values are hard to get not only because new researches
are periodically reporting reach gains (new MFs, more efficient
signal processing, etc) but also because equipment vendors do
not announce them in their next generation products due to
market competition. So, we have considered |M | = 4 available
MF configurations with number of FSs nm and transparent
reach Tm shown in Table III which allow us to analyze the
efficiency of the proposed methods. Concerning the resilience
evaluation, we consider c ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5, 6} as the number of
critical nodes. Concerning the demand set D, we consider
4 sets with increasing number of demands for Germany50
(instances named ’Ger a’, ’Ger b’, ’Ger c’ and ’Ger d’), 2
sets for PalmettoNet (instances named ’Pal a’ and ’Pal b’) and
2 sets for MissouriNA (instances named ’Mis a’ and ’Mis b’).
Table III: Modulation format configurations.
m nm (no. of FSs) Tm (km)
1 1 500
2 2 1250
3 3 2000
4 4 2500
All results were obtained using the optimization software
Gurobi Optimizer version 8.0.0, with programming language
MatLab version 9.4.0.813654 (R2018a), running on a PC with
an Intel Core i7-8700, 3.2 GHz and 16 GB RAM.
Table IV presents the resilience evaluation results. Column
’RMSA’ presents the runtime (in seconds) of Algorithm 1
showing that the RMSA policy for the regular state takes a
considerably large amount of the total runtime. The resilience
evaluation (value and runtime) of the CND and the NDC based
methods are presented separately (the best resilience values
highlighted in bold). These results show that the CDN based
method (i.e., computing the critical nodes based on the impact
of node failures on the connectivity between the other nodes)
is the best heuristic for larger values of c while the NDC
based method (i.e., computing the critical nodes based on the
impact of the node failures on the supported demand between
the other nodes) is the best heuristic for the smallest values of
c and only in the Germany50 instances. Concerning runtimes,
as observed in Section IV, the CND based method is computed
quicker than the NDC based method.
Table IV: Resilience evaluation of existing networks.
Inst.
RMSA
c
CND method NDC method
Time (s) Value Time (s) Value Time (s)
Ger a 23
2 0.8433 2 0.8283 12
3 0.5750 1 0.5750 4
4 0.5200 2 0.5200 4
5 0.4050 3 0.4983 5
6 0.3350 3 0.4683 9
Ger b 50
2 0.8457 4 0.7380 22
3 0.5804 2 0.5804 5
4 0.5224 3 0.5224 6
5 0.4049 5 0.5004 7
6 0.3388 6 0.4727 13
Ger c 51
2 0.8257 3 0.7236 23
3 0.5878 2 0.5878 5
4 0.5345 3 0.5345 6
5 0.4128 4 0.5088 12
6 0.3453 5 0.4149 8
Ger d 52
2 0.8128 3 0.7119 23
3 0.5930 2 0.5930 5
4 0.5252 7 0.5426 6
5 0.4186 5 0.5084 12
6 0.3357 4 0.4284 9
Pal a 19
2 0.5165 1 0.5496 2
3 0.3430 1 0.4587 3
4 0.2769 1 0.2851 3
5 0.1653 1 0.2190 3
6 0.1116 1 0.1632 4
Pal b 24
2 0.5161 1 0.5528 2
3 0.3492 1 0.4594 3
4 0.2833 1 0.2925 3
5 0.1730 1 0.2266 4
6 0.1194 1 0.1715 4
Mis a 51
2 0.4657 2 0.8770 8
3 0.2964 2 0.6694 17
4 0.2218 2 0.3327 11
5 0.1593 2 0.2581 12
6 0.1169 2 0.1734 12
Mis b 69
2 0.4598 3 0.8720 9
3 0.3140 3 0.6592 18
4 0.2366 3 0.4271 12
5 0.1652 3 0.2470 11
6 0.1265 3 0.1786 12
Tables V and VI present the network design results (run-
ning Algorithm 4 with 1000 iterations). Table V shows the
performance of the generation and validation part of the multi-
start greedy randomized algorithm showing the number of
valid EONs (out of the 1000), and the runtime spent in the
generation, topology validation and RMSA validation. Once
again, the RMSA is the part by far most time consuming.
Moreover, the more supported demands, the less number of
generated EONs are valid (behavior easily observed in the
Germany50 instances). Table VI presents the results of the
evaluation of the valid EONs (resilience values of the original
cases repeated in column ’Original’ for comparison reasons).
The most important conclusion is that the resilience value of
the best EONs is always much higher than the original EONs.
A second conclusion is that the resilience evaluation also takes
a significant amount of runtime. Note that the total runtime of
the network design task is given by the sum of the 3 time
values of Table V and the time value of Table VI. So, in
overall, the method takes several hours to run, which is still
reasonable for a network design task.
Table V: Network design - generation and validation.
Inst.
Valid Time (hh:mm:ss)
EONs Generation Topology Val. RMSA Val.
Ger a 929 00:00:01 00:00:48 06:52:47
Ger b 676 00:00:01 00:00:47 14:02:58
Ger c 260 00:00:01 00:00:46 14:09:54
Ger d 23 00:00:01 00:00:46 14:20:49
Pal a 1000 00:00:01 00:00:01 04:52:14
Pal b 999 00:00:01 00:00:01 07:10:13
Mis a 1000 00:00:01 00:00:01 12:16:21
Mis b 1000 00:00:01 00:00:01 18:41:03
Figure 1 presents the original topologies and the best
topologies obtained for c = 3 critical nodes and for the
instances with more demands of each network. To understand
the differences, links of the best topology not in the original
topology are highlighted in dashed blue and the critical nodes
of each case are represented with red squares. The number
of links highlighted in blue clearly shows that the resilience
improvement of the network design solutions is obtained with
topologies which are very different from the original ones.
Another interesting aspect is the comparison of the node
degree distributions between the original topologies and the
topologies of the best network design solutions. Figure 2
shows these distributions for the 8 instances with the best
EONs obtained for c = 3 critical nodes (original topologies in
blue and best topologies in green). In the best solutions, there
is a decrease of the number of nodes with the lowest and
highest degrees and an increase of the number of nodes with
degrees closer to the average. This observation also stands for
the other values of c showing that EONs resilient to multiple
node failures tend to have more homogeneous node degrees.
Table VI: Network design - evaluation.
Inst. c Original Best Time (hh:mm:ss)
Ger a
2 0.8283 0.9200 00:51:53
3 0.5750 0.8067 00:51:07
4 0.5200 0.6517 00:51:14
5 0.4050 0.5150 00:48:57
6 0.3350 0.4217 00:45:04
Ger b
2 0.7380 0.8824 01:17:15
3 0.5804 0.7624 01:17:22
4 0.5224 0.6490 01:14:25
5 0.4049 0.5224 01:11:58
6 0.3388 0.4171 01:01:32
Ger c
2 0.7236 0.8588 00:27:55
3 0.5878 0.7500 00:31:41
4 0.5345 0.6466 00:32:11
5 0.4128 0.5162 00:30:02
6 0.3453 0.4135 00:25:48
Ger d
2 0.7119 0.8191 00:04:18
3 0.5930 0.7246 00:03:47
4 0.5252 0.6214 00:05:32
5 0.4186 0.5142 00:04:04
6 0.3357 0.3878 00:03:23
Pal a
2 0.5165 0.8306 00:30:37
3 0.3430 0.6488 00:28:59
4 0.2769 0.4855 00:27:55
5 0.1653 0.3533 00:22:56
6 0.1116 0.2438 00:19:50
Pal b
2 0.5161 0.8300 00:37:15
3 0.3492 0.6493 00:33:26
4 0.2833 0.4855 00:32:44
5 0.1730 0.3553 00:26:36
6 0.1194 0.2466 00:22:32
Mis a
2 0.4657 0.8226 01:10:41
3 0.2964 0.6935 01:40:11
4 0.2218 0.5242 01:06:44
5 0.1593 0.3992 01:05:17
6 0.1169 0.3105 01:00:55
Mis b
2 0.4598 0.8229 01:29:37
3 0.3140 0.6979 02:03:13
4 0.2366 0.5298 01:17:20
5 0.1652 0.4033 01:17:49
6 0.1265 0.3170 01:13:04
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we have considered the evaluation and network
design of EONs resilient to multiple node failures. First,
we have addressed the resilience of EONs to multiple node
failures by identifying the critical nodes whose simultaneous
failure maximally reduce the demand percentage that is sup-
ported by the network. Then, for the same estimated demands,
the same RMSA policy and a fiber budget equal to the total
fiber length of an existing EON, we have addressed the design
of a new EON maximizing the resilience metric imposed by
its critical nodes. For both tasks, we have proposed heuristic
methods that were evaluated on known network topologies.
The results showed that the network design solutions are
much more resilient to multiple node failures. The improve-
ments are obtained with topologies with more homogeneous
node degrees which are very different from the original ones.
In computing terms, a key aspect is the RMSA which was the
most computational demanding part of the proposed methods.
Figure 1: Original topologies (left) and best topologies (right)
for c = 3 critical nodes (in red). Links not in the original
topology highlighted in dashed blue in the best topology.
Note that the adopted RMSA policy assumes a restoration
mechanism where disrupted demands are reassigned as much
as possible with new lightpaths supporting the same line rate.
A topic that deserves further study is to consider bandwidth
squeezed protection/restoration mechanisms (exploiting the
advanced flexibility provided by sliceable bandwidth-variable
transponders) [6] where the line rate supported by lightpaths
is dynamically reduced so that more lightpaths can be accom-
modated in the case of large-scale failures.
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